Hossein Jorjani First publication: 2026 – 07 – 19 Formal logic and dialectical reasoning are often presented as mutually exclusive approaches. This opposition, however, concerns not the validity of logical inference but the domain to which different forms of reasoning are applied. Formal logic, in the classical tradition, operates upon abstract concepts according to principlesContinue reading “Excursus 094 – On Formal Logic and Changing Reality”
Tag Archives: deduction
Excursus 058 – On the Ecology of Inference
Hossein Jorjani First publication: 2026 – 07 – 18 It is often assumed that induction, deduction, Bayesian inference, and inference to the best explanation (IBE) are competing accounts of scientific reasoning. An alternative perspective is that they represent complementary modes of inference whose relative usefulness depends upon the quantity, organization, and reliability of the availableContinue reading “Excursus 058 – On the Ecology of Inference”
Excursus 039 – On Bacon’s Asymmetry of Induction and Deduction
Hossein Jorjani First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30 Bacon’s principal target of criticism in Novum Organum I:30 was the upward movement from particulars to general propositions. He argued that the traditional method, which he termed inductio vulgaris (“vulgar induction”), merely gathered instances, leapt prematurely to universal statements, and then relied on syllogistic demonstration toContinue reading “Excursus 039 – On Bacon’s Asymmetry of Induction and Deduction”
Excursus 026 – On the Asymmetry Between Verification and Falsification
Hossein Jorjani First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30 In Aphorism I:46 of the Novum Organum (1620), Bacon observed that the human intellect naturally favors confirming instances while overlooking or explaining away contrary evidence. He therefore concluded that, in the establishment of a true axiom, the negative instance possesses greater evidential force than the affirmative.Continue reading “Excursus 026 – On the Asymmetry Between Verification and Falsification”
Excursus 009 – On Induction, Deduction, and the Syllogistic Structure of Aristotle
Hossein Jorjani First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30 In Aristotle’s theory of demonstrative science (epistēmē apodeiktikē), knowledge arises through necessary reasoning from first principles (archai). These principles are grasped intuitively by nous and form the foundation from which other propositions follow through deduction. The following outline summarizes the Aristotelian system of deductive reasoning: InContinue reading “Excursus 009 – On Induction, Deduction, and the Syllogistic Structure of Aristotle”
Excursus 006 – On Hypothetico-Deductive Models
Hossein Jorjani First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30 Bacon’s methodological critique in the the Novum Organum may be fruitfully assessed in relation to the various forms of the hypothetico-deductive (H–D) model that developed after his time. The relationship was not one of direct alignment but of partial resonance and principled divergence. First, classical H–DContinue reading “Excursus 006 – On Hypothetico-Deductive Models”
Excursus 005 – On Hypothetico-Deductive Model
Hossein Jorjani First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30 The term deductive in the modern hypothetico-deductive model preserves the formal structure of Aristotelian deduction while fundamentally transforming its epistemological function. In Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, apodeixis signified demonstrative reasoning from first principles—propositions regarded as certain, self-evident, and indemonstrable. Deduction served to preserve that certainty: derived conclusionsContinue reading “Excursus 005 – On Hypothetico-Deductive Model”