Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30
In Aphorism I:46 of the Novum Organum (1620), Bacon observed that the human intellect naturally favors confirming instances while overlooking or explaining away contrary evidence. He therefore concluded that, in the establishment of a true axiom, the negative instance possesses greater evidential force than the affirmative. While Bacon asserted this asymmetry, he neither developed it formally nor applied it consistently throughout the Novum Organum. His inductive method emphasized the gradual elimination of error through exclusions and comparative instances, but it lacked a systematic account of how a single counterexample might decisively refute a general claim.
This stood in contrast to David Hume’s later critique of induction, which argued that no amount of empirical observation could logically justify universal claims. For Hume, induction was grounded not in reason but in habit—the mind’s tendency to expect regularity from repeated experience—thus exposing the epistemological limits of empirical generalization. Nevertheless, this aphorism anticipated a central concern in twentieth-century philosophy of science: the asymmetry between verification and falsification.
Thinkers such as Karl Popper later argued that while no number of confirming instances can prove a universal theory, a single falsifying instance can, in principle, refute it. This asymmetry, however, applies most directly to what has elsewhere been termed a simplicus—a theory whose explanatory force depends upon a single, unified principle. Compositum theories, by contrast, often survive apparently falsifying observations by modifying one component while leaving the broader theoretical framework intact. The asymmetry between verification and falsification is therefore strongest for non-composite theories and becomes progressively weaker as theoretical structure grows more composite
Bacon, F. (1620) Novum Organum, Aphorism I-XLVI (1:46)
The human intellect, once it has embraced an idea—whether from having received it as credible or because it is pleasing—draws all other things into alignment with it, seeking confirmation and agreement. Even if there is a greater number and weight of counter-instances, it either fails to notice them, disregards them, or pushes them aside through distinctions, not without significant and harmful prejudice, so that its prior assumptions may retain their authority unchallenged. Thus, the response of the man who, when shown a tablet in a temple depicting those who survived shipwreck and fulfilled their vows, was asked whether he now recognized the power of the gods, replied with a counter-question: “But where are those portrayed who, despite making vows, perished?”—was well made. This is the general structure of all superstition: in astrology, dreams, omens, divine retributions, and similar things, people—being enamored of such vanities—note when predictions are fulfilled, but ignore and overlook the far more frequent failures. This fallacy, however, penetrates far more subtly into philosophy and science. Once something is pleasing, it taints and orders everything else around it, even though those others may be firmer and more valid. And even apart from the delight and vanity previously mentioned, there is a deep-seated and perpetual flaw in the human mind: it is more strongly affected and stirred by affirmatives than by negatives, though it ought rightly to regard both with equal impartiality. Indeed, in the establishment of any true axiom, the negative instance carries greater evidential force.
Hossein Jorjani 