Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 09 – 13
Explanatory systems frequently introduce concepts for things that cannot simply be identified with what is directly observed. Plato’s Forms, Fichte’s different forms of the I, Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, Freud’s id, ego, and superego, and Jung’s psychological types are very different examples, but they raise a common methodological question: when are we justified in moving from a concept that helps organize or explain experience to the claim that something corresponding to that concept actually exists?
The usefulness of a concept within an explanatory system does not by itself establish the existence of the entity it describes. A concept may connect observations, organize experience, resolve difficulties within a theory, or make other propositions in the system intelligible. It may even be indispensable to the architecture of that system. None of these facts alone provides independent ontological warrant for treating the proposed entity as part of reality.
This is particularly important with philosophical systems. An entity may appear necessary because other parts of the system depend upon it. But internal necessity is not necessarily ontological necessity. If a philosophical system requires Absolute Spirit in order to function, for example, that demonstrates something about the architecture of the system. It does not, without further argument, demonstrate the existence of Absolute Spirit.
The distinction is not simply between philosophy and science. Sciences also introduce theoretical entities that are not directly observed. Their scientific status does not automatically make those entities real. The relevant difference is the kind of warrant available for them. A proposed entity acquires scientific credibility when observations, experiments, predictions, measurements, or other independent evidence provide reasons for accepting its existence or causal role. Such warrant may become very strong, remain provisional, or eventually disappear as theories and evidence change.
Some cases lie between the obvious extremes. Freud’s id, ego, and superego, for example, were connected to attempts to explain observed patterns of thought and behaviour. The question is therefore not settled by calling them “constructs.” We must ask whether the observations provide independent evidence for the proposed psychological structures, whether alternative explanations account for the same observations, and what additional consequences follow if the proposed entities really exist.
A useful conceptual distinction is therefore required between explanatory usefulness and ontological warrant. A construct can be intellectually fruitful without corresponding to a separately existing entity, while an initially hypothetical scientific entity may acquire substantial ontological warrant through evidence that was not simply built into the theory that proposed it.
The danger arises when explanatory usefulness is silently converted into existence. Once a concept becomes familiar, receives a name, and occupies a stable position within a theory, it can easily begin to be discussed as though the corresponding thing had already been established. Naming an explanatory construct, however, does not bring its object into existence.
The appropriate question is therefore not whether an entity originated in philosophy or science, nor whether the concept built around it has been influential or fruitful. It is what warrants the step from the explanatory construct to the ontological claim.
A place in a theory is not, by itself, evidence of a place in reality.
