Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 07 – 18
The term dialectic has accumulated multiple and often incompatible meanings over the course of its history. Contemporary discussions frequently employ the term without specifying which dialectical tradition is intended. As a result, ideas drawn from thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, Engels, Lukács, Sartre, Adorno, Gurvitch, Bhaskar, Žižek, and others are often combined without regard to their original philosophical contexts or their mutual compatibility.
This ambiguity arises because dialectic has never denoted a single, stable doctrine. Rather, successive philosophers have reinterpreted the concept in accordance with their own metaphysical, epistemological, or methodological commitments. Similar terminology therefore does not guarantee conceptual continuity. The dialectic of Plato differs fundamentally from that of Hegel; Hegel’s from Marx’s; Marx’s from Sartre’s; and so forth. Although historical influences may exist among these traditions, each assigns the term a distinct theoretical function.
Consequently, references to dialectic should always specify the particular author or tradition under consideration rather than treating the term as though it designated a unified philosophical position. Failure to do so risks conflating distinct doctrines, attributing to one thinker ideas that belong to another, and obscuring the philosophical differences that make each conception distinctive.
More generally, this illustrates a fundamental hermeneutical principle: philosophical terminology cannot be interpreted independently of the conceptual framework in which it is employed. The identity of a philosophical concept is determined not merely by its name but by its function within a particular theoretical system.
Hossein Jorjani 