Excursus 053 – On the Identity of Scientific and Philosophical Theories

Hossein Jorjani

First publication: 2026 – 07 – 18

Scientific and philosophical theories naturally evolve. Their concepts are refined, empirical claims revised, and new problems incorporated. The resulting continuity raises an important methodological question: at what point does a revised theory become a different theory?

The identity of a theory cannot be reduced to its terminology or to a collection of individual propositions. Words may survive while their meanings change, and isolated conclusions may persist after the explanatory framework that originally generated them has been abandoned. Rather, a mature theory possesses an internal architecture in which certain organizing principles determine the relations among its concepts and the forms of explanation it permits.

For this reason, theoretical identity depends primarily upon continuity of explanatory architecture rather than continuity of vocabulary. Internal revisions may refine evidence, modify concepts, or extend applications without altering the theory itself. However, when the organizing principles that generate the explanatory system are fundamentally reconstructed, historical continuity may remain while theoretical identity changes.

This distinction helps explain why intellectual traditions often give rise to new theoretical schools. Expressions such as Neo-Darwinism, Neo-Kantianism, or Post-Marxism acknowledge historical inheritance while recognizing that a reconstructed explanatory architecture constitutes more than a simple revision of the original theory.

Leave a comment