Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30
In discussions of social, economic, and political questions, structural constraints and institutional constraints are often treated as though they were identical. As a result, the origin of a phenomenon is frequently confused with the appropriate means of addressing it.
Human reproduction provides a straightforward example. Pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, and much of the initial care of infants are biological consequences of human reproduction. These costs arise from human biology itself and exist regardless of the economic or political system under which a society operates. The distribution of those costs, however, depends entirely upon social organization. Families, governments, employers, and other institutions may assume different shares of the burden. The biological costs of reproduction and the social costs of reproduction are therefore distinct concepts and should not be conflated.
The same distinction applies in many other contexts. Certain physical or cognitive disabilities have biological origins, yet their impact on an individual’s quality of life depends to a considerable extent upon education, medical care, accessibility, technological assistance, and social support. The biological origin of a condition does not diminish society’s responsibility to accommodate those affected, just as social responsibility does not alter the biological origin of the condition.
Economic organization provides another illustration. Some tendencies toward market concentration arise from structural features of production itself. Economies of scale, fixed costs, specialization, network effects, and coordination costs naturally limit the number of firms that can operate efficiently within a market. At the same time, competition policy, property rights, taxation, regulation, and other institutional arrangements also shape market structure. Economic concentration should therefore be understood neither as an inevitable consequence of capitalism nor solely as the product of government policy. Rather, the respective contributions of structural and institutional factors must be analyzed separately.
This distinction suggests a more general methodological principle. Before questions of justice, responsibility, or public policy can be addressed, the phenomenon under investigation should first be decomposed into its distinct causal components. Only then can proposed solutions be evaluated rationally and in accordance with reality. Correctly identifying the origin of a problem does not, by itself, determine the appropriate ethical or political response. It is, however, an indispensable prerequisite for designing responses that are both effective and intellectually coherent.
Hossein Jorjani 