Excursus 118 – On the Metaphysical and Historical Senses of Materialism

Hossein Jorjani

First publication: 2026 – 07 – 23

The term materialism has been used in philosophy in several distinct senses, and failure to distinguish them has been a frequent source of confusion.

In metaphysical (or ontological) materialism, represented classically by Hobbes, materialism is a theory of reality. It holds that only material substance exists and that mental phenomena are ultimately reducible to the motions or organization of matter. This is the doctrine opposed by George Berkeley, whose immaterialism denied the independent existence of material substance.

In historical materialism, associated with Marx, the term has a different meaning. Here, “material” refers not primarily to the substance of reality but to the material conditions of human existence—production, labor, technology, and economic organization. Marx’s central claim is not that only matter exists, but that the historical development of societies is fundamentally shaped by these material conditions rather than by autonomous ideas, religion, or philosophy.

These two doctrines are logically independent. One may accept metaphysical materialism while rejecting historical materialism, or accept Marx’s account of historical development without adopting Hobbes’s ontology. The shared term “materialism” therefore conceals two fundamentally different philosophical questions: What is reality made of? and What primarily explains the course of human history?

Marx’s originality did not consist in adopting metaphysical materialism in the Hobbesian sense, but in retaining Hegel’s dialectical conception of development while replacing Spirit (Geist) with the material conditions of social life as its principal subject.

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