Excursus 021 – On Recollection, Implicit Learning, and the Origins of Knowledge

Hossein Jorjani

First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30

Bacon’s account of how knowledge is acquired, as presented in Aphorism I:37 of the Novum Organum (1620), resonates with other non-dogmatic conceptions of learning, both ancient and modern. Socrates, by contrast, maintained that knowledge is possible. Although he acknowledged the limits of his own knowledge, he pursued wisdom through dialectical questioning and rejected the pretension that mastery of one discipline conferred universal understanding. While his claim that learning is recollection of pre-birth knowledge may be taken as mythical or metaphorical, modern perspectives offer alternative explanations.

One possibility is that certain patterns of response—moral intuitions, emotional predispositions, or cognitive biases—reflect evolved biological dispositions transmitted through genetic inheritance.

Another is that individuals in modern societies are immersed in vast quantities of passive information from their cultural and technological environments, much of which is absorbed without deliberate effort. Psychological research supports this: studies of implicit learning, ambient language exposure, and social observational learning show that individuals routinely internalize complex patterns without conscious awareness. It has also been shown that decision-making often relies on heuristics and is shaped by framing effects, revealing the pervasive influence of unnoticed cues and prior exposure.

These findings suggest that much of what appears to be spontaneous or self-generated knowledge may instead arise from processes that remain largely outside conscious awareness. Whether rooted in biological evolution or accumulated through prolonged cultural exposure, such influences provide modern naturalistic alternatives to the Platonic doctrine of recollection.

Bacon, F. (1620) Novum Organum, Aphorism I-XXXVII (1:37)

The position of those who embraced the doctrine of acatalepsy bears a certain resemblance to our method in its beginnings; yet in its outcome, it diverges greatly and stands in stark opposition. For they assert, in absolute terms, that nothing can be known; whereas we maintain that not much can be known about nature by the method currently in use. However, they proceed from this to destroy the authority of both the senses and the intellect; we, on the other hand, seek to invent and supply aids to both

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