Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 09 – 13
Citation performs several legitimate functions in scholarly work. A researcher may use previous works to develop an idea through comparison and criticism, to compare an independently formed idea with existing views, to obtain evidence or premises, to adopt a method, to use a concept or definition, or to identify a position that is being criticized. In all these cases, the citation tells the reader something important about the relation between the present work and another source.
But citation performs other functions as well. References may indicate familiarity with a field, increase the perceived scholarly character of a text, associate an author with a particular intellectual tradition, or lend the apparent authority of a recognized scholar to an argument. These effects are not necessarily improper. Readers cannot investigate everything independently, and signs of expertise and familiarity with previous work are often useful. The problem begins when such signs are mistaken for the merits of the argument itself.
An idea may arise from previous literature, but it may also arise from observation, experience, reflection, or independent reasoning. The fact that someone else has previously expressed a similar idea does not determine whether the idea is sound. Conversely, an idea does not become stronger merely because a famous scholar can be cited in its support. What matters is what the cited work actually contributes. Does it provide evidence, a premise, a method, a concept, or an argument that the present work needs? If it does, the citation has an identifiable epistemic function. If it does not, the citation cannot by itself provide epistemic warrant.
It is therefore useful to distinguish three questions. How was an idea formed? How good is the idea? How is the idea received? These questions may influence one another, but they are not the same. An idea independently arrived at may later be found in earlier literature. That discovery changes its intellectual context and may create a scholarly obligation to acknowledge the earlier work, but it does not retrospectively make that work the source or justification of the independently formed idea.
The distinction also places a responsibility on the reader. The reputation of an author, the number of references, the prestige of the people cited, and familiarity with the expected literature can all serve as useful signals. They may tell us that a work deserves attention. They should not, however, replace examination of the work itself whenever such examination is possible.
Citation is therefore neither a guarantee of intellectual merit nor a necessary condition for it. Its value depends on the relation it establishes between one work and another. A sound argument should not need an established name merely to make it respectable, and an unsound argument does not become sound by acquiring one.
The merit of an idea must ultimately be judged by the evidence and reasoning relevant to it, rather than by the intellectual company it keeps.
Hossein Jorjani 