Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 07 – 19
The value of an intellectual discipline should not be confused with its scientific status. Philosophy, history, literature, art, and political thought have produced some of humanity’s most profound achievements without thereby becoming sciences. The question is therefore not whether every discipline ought to become scientific, but rather what distinguishes those disciplines that legitimately claim scientific status.
No single criterion is sufficient. Scientific disciplines differ widely in their subject matter, methods, and historical development. Nevertheless, several characteristics recur throughout the history of successful sciences. They seek systematic explanations of observable phenomena; they formulate propositions that are, in principle, open to empirical evaluation; they subject competing explanations to criticism and revision; and they progressively develop methods that increase the reliability, precision, and reproducibility of knowledge.
One of the most conspicuous historical trends has been the increasing use of measurement, quantification, statistical inference, mathematical modelling, and computation. These developments should not be interpreted as implying that science is reducible to mathematics or that every meaningful question admits of numerical treatment. Rather, quantitative methods have repeatedly proved valuable because they permit more precise comparison, prediction, replication, and estimation of uncertainty than qualitative description alone.
Scientific disciplines also differ in the degree to which these methods can be applied. Astronomy, physics, chemistry, genetics, and epidemiology have become highly quantitative because many of their central phenomena lend themselves to measurement. Other disciplines confront subject matter that is more resistant to quantification or more strongly influenced by historical contingency, interpretation, or human reflexivity. These differences affect the methods available, but they do not abolish the distinction between more and less scientific approaches within a discipline.
Scientific status should therefore be understood as a matter of degree rather than as an all-or-nothing property. Disciplines become more scientific to the extent that they develop reliable methods for testing explanations, measuring uncertainty, correcting error, and progressively refining knowledge. The defining feature of science is not certainty but the continual improvement of methods for distinguishing more reliable explanations from less reliable ones.
For this reason, the scientific enterprise is best understood not as a fixed collection of disciplines but as an evolving methodological tradition. What unites the sciences is less their subject matter than their shared commitment to systematic inquiry, empirical criticism, and the continuous refinement of knowledge.
Hossein Jorjani 