Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 07 – 18
Discussions concerning science often fail to distinguish between scientific knowledge and its practical applications. The distinction is fundamental.
Science seeks to understand, explain, and predict natural phenomena. Technology applies such knowledge to achieve practical ends. Although the two are closely related and frequently develop together, they are not identical. Scientific discoveries often enable new technologies, just as technological innovations frequently create new opportunities for scientific investigation. Nevertheless, the aims of the two enterprises remain distinct.
Failure to maintain this distinction may lead to serious philosophical confusion. The moral or political evaluation of a technology does not, by itself, determine the epistemological status of the scientific knowledge upon which it is based. Nuclear physics is not a nuclear weapon. Genetics is not eugenics. Statistical inference is not mass surveillance. Scientific theories may contribute to beneficial or harmful technologies, but their applications should not be confused with the theories themselves.
The same distinction applies more generally to all forms of knowledge. Knowledge creates possibilities for action, but it does not determine how those possibilities will be employed. Scientific, social, historical, and philosophical knowledge have all been used both to promote human welfare and to advance systems of domination. Such examples demonstrate the ethical ambiguity of the uses of knowledge rather than any inherent moral character of knowledge itself.
Francis Bacon’s dictum scientia potentia est (“knowledge is power”) is frequently interpreted as identifying knowledge with domination. Yet Bacon’s larger project suggests a different emphasis. Knowledge increases human power by expanding the range of possible action. Whether that power is exercised for healing or destruction, liberation or oppression, depends upon moral and political choices lying beyond science itself.
Critiques that identify science as inherently oppressive therefore risk confusing the applications of scientific knowledge with its epistemological character. The existence of harmful applications does not alter the truth or falsity of scientific claims. Ethical evaluation and epistemological evaluation remain distinct, even though both are indispensable for understanding the place of science in human society.
Hossein Jorjani 