Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 07 – 08
One question repeatedly arose while reading Gurvitch’s critique of Plato and Plotinus: Can one consistently be both a dialectician and a believer in God? The question, however, becomes more illuminating when reformulated. The decisive issue is not whether one believes in God, but what kind of ultimate reality one’s dialectic presupposes.
The history of philosophy offers many examples of thinkers who combined religious belief with dialectical thought. Plotinus, Saint Augustine, Hegel, and numerous modern theologians all sought to reconcile religious commitment with a dialectical understanding of reality. Yet they did not necessarily understand the object of that commitment in the same way. The philosophical question therefore concerns less the existence of God than the ontological status attributed to the highest principle.
For the purposes of the present discussion, it is useful to distinguish between closed dialectics and open dialectics. These expressions are introduced here as analytical tools rather than as established philosophical terminology.
A closed dialectic possesses a fixed ontological centre or final principle. Dialectical movement may occur throughout reality, but it ultimately converges upon an already complete and immutable source. Whatever changes take place within the world, the highest principle itself remains beyond change. Plotinus exemplifies this conception. The One is absolute, perfect, immutable, and the source from which all reality proceeds and to which it ultimately returns. Saint Augustine transforms this framework by identifying the highest principle with the transcendent Christian God and by assigning the decisive role to divine grace rather than to dialectical inquiry itself. Nevertheless, the overall structure remains similar: dialectical movement occurs in relation to an immutable ultimate reality.
An open dialectic, by contrast, recognizes no final immutable centre. Every level of reality—including its highest organizing principles—remains, at least in principle, open to further development, reinterpretation, or transformation. Dialectical movement does not culminate in a completed metaphysical order but remains permanently unfinished. Gurvitch’s repeated criticism of fixed ontologies, immutable hierarchies, predetermined conclusions, and the “Eternal Present” suggests that his conception of dialectic is best understood as an open dialectic.
Modern theology illustrates that belief in God need not imply a closed dialectic. While classical theology generally understands God as eternal and immutable, process theology has proposed a more dynamic conception of the divine, emphasizing God’s evolving relation to creation. Whether such views remain compatible with traditional doctrines of divine perfection is a matter for theology rather than for the present discussion. Philosophically, they demonstrate that different conceptions of ultimate reality generate different forms of dialectical thought.
The distinction proposed here is intended neither as a classification of religions nor as an argument for or against religious belief. Rather, it highlights an important relationship between metaphysics and dialectics. Every dialectic presupposes some conception of ultimate reality. Whether that reality is called the One, God, Nature, History, or something else is less important than whether it is regarded as already complete and immutable or as itself capable of genuine development.
Hossein Jorjani 