Hossein Jorjani
First publication: 2026 – 06 – 30
It may be argued that, alongside the two methodological paths described by Bacon, there exists a third path that begins from experience but allows for the early projection of broad hypotheses, which then guide the search for intermediate propositions and empirical tests. These high-level generalizations guide the derivation of intermediate propositions, which are subsequently tested against further experience. According to this view, such hypothetical reasoning—if disciplined by empirical testing and kept provisional—can stimulate productive inquiry and has been a hallmark of scientific genius. Historical examples often cited in support of this view include the theories of gravitation, the wave theory of light, and the theory of evolution.
However, access to previously unavailable sources, such as Darwin’s notebooks from the 1830s (unpublished until the late twentieth century), complicates this picture. These documents show that Darwin develops his theory of natural selection not by leaping to a general hypothesis but through a careful, inductive process of compiling evidence, refining analogies, and reasoning through intermediate conceptual steps. Contrary to the heroic narrative of sudden insight, Darwin’s method reflects a more Baconian ascent from particulars to general principles. This suggests that what might appear in hindsight as hypothesis-driven breakthroughs often rests on long periods of incremental, inductive construction.
A further model of scientific progress differs from both Bacon’s methodical ascent and the hypothesis-driven “third way” is what may be loosely termed scientific progress through jumps. In this model, scientific knowledge does not advance through a smooth, continuous path from particulars to general axioms, but rather through irregular, sometimes abrupt reconfigurations of theoretical frameworks. These “jumps” are often triggered not by the accumulation of evidence alone but by shifts in conceptual vision or changes in the interpretive grid through which evidence is understood. Paradigmatic examples include the Copernican revolution, quantum mechanics, and relativity—cases in which previously marginal insights suddenly gain central explanatory power, not by stepwise ascent but by a reorganization of foundational assumptions. This model aligns closely with Thomas Kuhn’s view of scientific revolutions, wherein progress unfolds not by linear accumulation but by episodic reconfiguration of fundamental concepts.
A fourth model emphasizes the enabling role of technology and instrumentation as independent drivers of scientific discovery. According to this view, breakthroughs in scientific understanding are often preceded—or even made possible—by innovations in the tools of observation, measurement, and mobility. Galileo’s telescope, Leeuwenhoek’s microscope, and modern particle accelerators or space telescopes exemplify this pathway. The rise of the shipping industry—though seemingly mundane—is critical for the development of natural history and evolutionary theory, enabling figures from Linné’s students to Darwin and Wallace to gather empirical data from across the globe. More recently, the invention of DNA sequencing techniques accelerated progress in molecular biology and many related fields, unlocking insights into genetic variation, phylogeny, and disease. Such tools extend the reach of the senses and allow phenomena to be perceived, quantified, or manipulated in ways previously impossible. This model shifts emphasis from purely cognitive or theoretical processes to the material infrastructures that enable knowledge. In many cases, the refinement of instrumentation leads to the discovery of new domains of inquiry, rendering possible new hypotheses and prompting revisions to existing theoretical frameworks. From this perspective, the method of discovery is not purely logical or imaginative, but also infrastructural and technological.
These models should not be regarded as mutually exclusive. Scientific progress has proceeded through different combinations of inductive reasoning, hypothesis formation, conceptual reorganization, and technological innovation, each becoming more or less prominent according to the historical circumstances and the nature of the phenomena under investigation.
Hossein Jorjani 